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Serbia’s Action against Transnational Organised Crime  
 
Abstract 
This article aims to examine this question.  It will begin by identifying core obligations imposed 
upon States by the UNTOC.  After exploring definitions relating to organised crime stipulated in 
this instrument, the article will highlight obligations relating to prohibition of substantive 
offences, as well as the core areas of law enforcement: special investigative techniques 
(intelligence-led law enforcement), confiscation of criminal proceeds and international law 
enforcement cooperation.  Having explored the relevant international standards, the article will 
analyse the extent to which these are incorporated and implemented by Serbia through an 
examination of legislative frameworks as well as law enforcement practices.  The main 
conclusion reached is that, while Serbia has taken some steps to implement international 
standards with a view to enhancing individual and collective action against transnational 
organised crime, effective law enforcement is hampered by issues such as corruption and a lack 
of expertise, experience and resources.   
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1. Introduction  
Transnational organised crime is a serious problem in Serbia.  The major criminalities 
include trafficking of drugs and arms, distribution of counterfeit currencies, vehicle crimes, 
money laundering and fiscal/exercise fraud.1  Human trafficking and migrant smuggling have 
also been identified as a concern in recent times, the most recent example being the influx of 
migrants in the wake of the current refugee crisis.   It has been estimated that around 60 
organised criminal groups of varying sizes and structures are operating nationally, regionally and 
globally.2  Serbia is located on the so-called Balkan route, where goods, services and people are 
transported illegally into and through its soil. The transnational nature of organised crime 
requires not only individual actions at the national level, but also collective actions regionally 
                                                          
1 Ministry of Interior, Organised Crime Threat Assessment in Serbia 2015, 123. 
2 Ibid. 
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and internationally.  An important step was taken with the adoption of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) 3  in 2000.  It establishes a 
number of obligations for Member States to strengthen individual and collective actions against 
this crime.  Serbia is one of the States which ratified this instrument at an early stage,4 and this 
demonstrates its willingness to abide by the relevant international standards stipulated in this 
instrument.  However, the level of their incorporation and implementation through legislative 
and other means is not entirely clear.   
The main purpose of this article, then, is to analyse the extent to which Serbia has 
facilitated individual and collective actions against transnational organised crime in accordance 
with the established standards.  The article will begin by identifying core obligations imposed 
upon States by the UNTOC.  After exploring a definition of an ‘organised criminal group’ 
stipulated in this instrument, it will highlight relevant obligations relating to prohibition of 
substantive offences as well as the key areas of law enforcement: special investigative techniques 
(intelligence-led law enforcement), confiscation of criminal proceeds, and international law 
enforcement cooperation.  Having identified the relevant international standards, the article will 
examine how Serbia has been able to strengthen its action against transnational organised crime 
through an analysis of legislative frameworks as well as law enforcement practices.  The main 
conclusion reached is that, while Serbia has taken some steps to enhance its responses in line 
with the UNTOC, issues such as corruption and a lack of expertise, experience and resources 
have hampered effective prevention and suppression of transnational organised crime in practice.   
 
2.   International Standards on Action against Transnational Organised Crime  
 
                                                          
3 2225 UNTS 209.   
4 6 September 2011. 
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2.1 Defining Organised Crime 
  
One of the important aspects of the UNTOC is stipulation of various definitions to be 
adopted by States.  To begin with, organised crime is to be understood as a ‘serious crime’ 
committed by an ‘organised criminal group’: 
‘Organised criminal group’ shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a 
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or 
offences established in accordance with this convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit.5 
 
A popular perception of organised crime among the general public perhaps is the involvement of 
large hierarchical criminal organisations like the Italian mafia, and this was particularly evident 
in the United States where La Cosa Nostra has been in existence.6  It is evident that the above 
definition of an ‘organised criminal group’ under the UNTOC does apply to this type of criminal 
organisations as it refers to a structured group of multiple individuals existing for a certain period 
of time.  
However, it was decided during the drafting stage of the UNTOC that the term would 
also apply to non-hierarchical groups.7  Article 2(c) in this regard stipulates that a structured 
group does not have to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership 
or a developed structure.   This also seems to be in line with the scholarly debates particularly 
within anthropology and political science which took place in the 1970s outside of the United 
                                                          
5 Art 2(a). 
6 See Cressey, D Theft of the Nation (Harper Collins 1969); Cohen, AK, ‘The Concepts of Criminal Organisation’ 
(1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 97; and Fijnaut, C, ‘Organized Crime: A Comparison Between the United 
States of America and Western Europe’ (1990) 30 British Journal of Criminology 321. 
7 Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiations for the Elaboration of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (2006), 7-18.   
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States8  which sustained that the perception of organised criminal groups being hierarchical was 
too simplistic and did not reflect the reality of contemporary organised crime.9  These scholars 
advocated a so-called ‘network model’ in which organised crime is understood to be carried out 
by a collection or network of individuals, small groups and departments, etc. collaborating with 
each other in varying combination.10   In looking at actual examples of organised criminal 
groups, it becomes apparent that many groups are indeed not hierarchical.  Contrary to a popular 
image, the Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia consisted of ‘loose combinations of relatively 
small, family based cocaine manufacturing firms that merely joined forces in the early 1980s.’11  
It has also been reported that Triads (Hong Kong) and Snakeheads (China) operate largely 
through informal networks rather than formal structural organisations.12  In view of these, it may 
be concluded that the network model is equally important in understanding organised crime, and 
that the definition in the UNTOC is broad enough to cover a wide range of criminal groups.     
A few more points should be highlighted in relation to the above definition.  According to 
Article 2(b), a ‘serious crime’ means conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum 
deprivation of liberty of at least 4 years.  Perceptions on the serious nature of organised crime are 
inevitably influenced by social, cultural, political and legal characteristics of each State.  
However, the fact that States have been able to agree on this provision demonstrates that it is 
possible to find common ground despite differences at national level.  The UNTOC also defines 
‘criminal offences’ as those being committed for financial or material benefit.  This is an 
                                                          
8  McIllwain, J, ‘Organised Crime: A Social Network Approach’ (1999) 32 Crime, Law and Social Change 301, 
303.   
9 Williams, P, and Godson, R, ‘Anticipating Organized and Transnational Crime’ (2002) 37 Crime, Law and Social 
Change 311, 332.   
10 Bruinsma, G, and Bernasco, W, ‘Criminal Groups and Transnational Illegal Markets’ (2004) 41 Crime, Law and 
Social Change 79, 79.   
11 Paoli, L, ‘The Paradoxes of Organised Crime’ (2000) 37 Crime, Law and Social Change 51, 68.   
12 Zhang, S, and Chin, KL, Characteristics of Chinese Human Smugglers: A Cross-National Study (U.S. Department 
of State 2003); and Chu, YK, The Triads as Business (Routledge 2008).   
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important aspect because what distinguishes organised crime from ordinary crime generally is 
the generation of longer-term, as opposed to immediate or one-off, profit or benefit.13  This 
means that criminal proceeds are normally diversified and reinvested in legal/illegal enterprises 
for generation of sustained income for criminals.14  Organised criminal groups therefore are 
comparable to legitimate corporations and businesses, except that they mainly operate in illegal 
markets.   
 
2.2 Prohibition of Organised Crime 
The first important obligation under the UNTOC is the prohibition of organised crime.  In 
addition to serious crimes committed by organised criminal groups, the UNTOC obliges States to 
criminalise so-called participation offences.15  The rationale for this inclusion is to prosecute and 
punish those who contribute to the operations of organised crime groups without directly 
committing substantive offences such as drug trafficking and money laundering.16  This can 
therefore be used to target mafia bosses who simply order their subordinates to commit various 
crimes, for instance.  There are two possibilities provided in Article 5 of the UNTOC. The first is 
criminalising an agreement to commit crimes.  This is also known as ‘conspiracy’ and is widely 
accepted by common law jurisdictions. The key aspect is that one can be prosecuted even when 
an offence is not actually committed.  However, this offence is not supported universally, 
particularly by civil law jurisdictions.17  In order to accommodate these States, Article 5 provides 
for another possibility: criminalisation of participation in the activities of organised criminal 
                                                          
13 Obokata, T, Transnational Organised Crime in International Law (Hart Publishing 2010), 22.  
14 Schloenhardt, A, ‘Organised Crime and the Business of Migrant Trafficking: an Economic Analysis’ (1999) 32 
Crime, Law and Social Change 203; and Cressey, supra n 6, 72. 
15 Art 5.   
16 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and Protocols Thereto (2004), 21. 
17 Obokata, supra n 13, 40-42.   
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groups, which requires actual conduct.  This generally covers activities which may not be 
criminal in nature on their own but still contribute to the achievement of a criminal aim.  So for 
instance, arranging transportation for criminals and purchasing property can fall under this.  The 
ambit therefore is wide, and this can raise an issue of legal certainty.  One mitigation here is the 
requirement of the ‘knowledge’ by a participant that his/her participation would help a group 
achieve its criminal objectives.  Acts such as carrying illegal goods without one knowing 
therefore are not to be criminalised.  Finally, so-called secondary participation (e.g. aiding and 
abetting) is to be punished under Article 5.   
The UNTOC also obliges States to address risk-averting strategies employed by 
criminals.  Money laundering is one example.18   Proceeds obtained as a result of organised 
crime are diversified and reinvested through this method.  There are three stages in the money 
laundering process.  The first is placement where illegal proceeds enter into the financial system.  
A technique known as ‘smurfing’ (or ‘structuring’) - dividing the proceeds into smaller bundles – 
is used in order to avoid detection through reporting or record-keeping by financial institutions. 
The second stage is laying where proceeds are moved from one place to another so as to conceal 
their origin.  Overseas offshore banks, which do not always have strict regulations, are often used 
for this purpose.  The final stage is integration where the proceeds are returned to the financial 
system.  It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to take action at this stage as the proceeds 
appear legitimate.  Therefore, it is essential that State Parties establish sufficient legal and 
administrative frameworks to detect and prosecute this offence.  States also must address other 
risk-averting strategies such as corruption and obstruction of justice.19  Bribery and a threat/use 
                                                          
18 Art 6.   
19 Arts 8 and 23 of the UNOTC.  See also the United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003, 2349 UNTS 41.    
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of violence against victims, witnesses, as well as jurors in criminal proceedings are common 
tactics used by criminals to avoid law enforcement.20   
Aside from these offences under the UNTOC, other subject-specific international treaties 
oblige States to prohibit various forms of organised crime such as migrant smuggling,21 
trafficking of firearms,22 drugs,23 cultural property,24 endangered species,25 and nuclear 
materials,26  illicit trade in tobacco products,27 child pornography,28 cybercrime,29 
counterfeiting30 and slavery/forced labour.31  In view of these, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that international law on transnational organised crime as represented by these legal instruments 
establish a clear obligation to criminalise organised crime and related conducts.  In particular, the 
UNTOC is broad enough to cover the existing as well as new and emerging criminalities as it is 
not subject-specific.  At the national level, although flexibility is necessary in order to allow 
States to formulate domestic criminal laws in accordance with their legal, political, social and 
cultural traditions, it is simultaneously important that the principle of legality is fully observed in 
                                                          
20 See for instance, UNODC, The Role of Corruption in Trafficking in Persons (UNODC 2011); Kugler, M, Verdier, 
T, and Zenou, Y, ‘Organised Crime, Corruption and Punishment’ (2005) 89 Journal of Public Economics 1639; and 
Mass, S, ‘The Dilemma of the Intimidated Witness in Federal Organised Crime Prosecution: Choosing among the 
Fear of Reprisal, the Contempt Powers of the Court, and the Witness Protection Programme’ (1981-1982) 50 
Fordham Law Review 582.  
21 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrant by Land, Sea and Air 2000, 2241 UNTS 507. 
22 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition 2001, 2326 UNTS 208.   
23 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, 1582 
UNTS 95.  
24 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property 1970 (UNESCO Cultural Convention), 823 UNTS 231; Convention for the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972, 11 ILM 1358; and Convention on the Protection of Archaeological, 
Historical and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations 1976, 15 ILM 1350.   
25 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 1973, 993 UNTS 243.  
26 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1979, 18 ILM 1419.   
27 Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 2012 to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, Decision FCTC/COP5 (1).  
28 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography 2000, 2171 UNTS 227.   
29 Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime 2001, ETS No. 187.    
30 International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency 1929, 112 LNTS 371. 
31 Slavery Convention 1926, 60 UNTS 254; and ILO Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced and Compulsory 
Labour 1930, 39 UNTS 55.   
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defining and establishing organised crime offences, which is also a well-established principle 
under international law.32  
 
2.3 Intelligence-Led Law Enforcement 
The sophisticated nature of organised crime and the modus operandi means that proactive 
intelligence-led law enforcement must be facilitated for successful prevention and suppression, 
as opposed to reactive law enforcement which is conducted after crimes are committed.  Article 
20 of the UNTOC is important in this regard.  For instance, it provides for controlled delivery.  
Article 2(i) defines this as ‘the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out 
of, through or into the territory of one or more States, with the knowledge and under the 
supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the 
identification of persons involved in the commission of the offence.’  Controlled delivery is often 
employed in the investigation and prosecution of drug related offences.33  The UNTOC also 
obliges States to consider allowing other techniques such as electronic surveillance and 
undercover operations.  The obligations under this Article are not strong as it uses phrases such 
as ‘if permitted by the basic principles of its domestic legal system’ and ‘within its possibilities.’   
Indeed, the interpretative note on this Article makes it clear that it ‘does not imply an obligation 
on State Parties to make provision for the use of all forms of special investigative technique’ and 
a degree of reluctance to be bound by hard obligations was also evident during the drafting 
                                                          
32 See for instance, art. 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1996 (ICCPR), 999 UNTS 
171, which provides that ‘no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. 
Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was 
committed.’   
33 Supra n 23, art 11; and Lee, GD, Global Drug Enforcement: Practical Investigative Techniques (CRC Press 
2004), 255.    
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stage.34   Article 20 also encourages States to facilitate international cooperation in using these 
techniques through bilateral or multilateral arrangements.  This is supplemented by Article 28, 
which touches upon collection, analysis and sharing of intelligence on organised crime.    
 
2.4 Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds 
Another important obligation to be implemented at the national level is confiscation of 
criminal proceeds or asset recovery.   An effective regime of confiscation can send a strong 
message to criminals that they are not able to benefit from their criminal activities, and this may 
have a degree of deterrent effect.  It can also significantly disrupt criminal activities or even 
dismantle criminal organisations.35  The first international instrument touching upon this is the 
UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988,36 
and the UNTOC has made it relevant to different forms of organised crime.  To being with, 
Article 12 obliges States to take necessary measures to confiscate criminal proceeds or property 
whose value corresponds to that of such proceeds.  States also have to target other property 
converted from criminal proceeds as well as income and other benefits generated from such 
proceeds.  In addition, Article 12 makes it clear that States are not to rely on bank secrecy to 
evade their obligations and also are allowed to require offenders to prove the lawful origin of 
alleged proceeds, shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution.     
Confiscation of criminal proceeds can be divided roughly into two categories.  The first is 
conviction-based confiscation.  As the name suggests, a confiscation order is issued after one is 
convicted of organised crime.  In addition, some States, including Australia, Canada, Ireland, 
                                                          
34 Travaux Préparatoires, supra n 7, 205-206.   
35 Vettori, B, Tough on Criminal Wealth: Exploring the Practice of Proceeds from Crime Confiscation in the EU 
(Springer 2006), 3. 
36 Supra n 23, art 5.        
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Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America,37 also rely on non-conviction-
based confiscation.  This can be facilitated through civil proceedings, using ‘balance of 
probabilities’ as the standard of proof, without conviction.  For this reason, non-conviction-based 
confiscation is sometimes referred to as ‘civil asset recovery’ in some jurisdictions such as the 
United Kingdom and Ireland.  Here, the guilt is not associated with property and not the 
offenders.  A practical implication of this divergence in confiscation regimes is that it can make 
international cooperation somewhat difficult as many States, particularly civil law jurisdictions, 
do not rely upon non-conviction-based asset recovery, for instance.  A high degree of mutual 
respect and recognition therefore is needed among State Parties in facilitating cross-border 
confiscation of criminal proceeds.   
 
2.5 International Cooperation 
The main aim of the UNTOC is to promote cooperation for more effective prevention and 
suppression of transnational organised crime,38  and it establishes a number of obligations in this 
regard.  One example is extradition under Article 16.   This is facilitated mainly by bilateral 
and/or multilateral treaties.  International instruments touching upon various types of organised 
crime such as corruption and drug trafficking also have provisions on extradition.39  As the 
consolidated version of these relating to organised crime, the UNTOC provides detailed 
guidance on extradition under Article 16.  The benefit of this provision is that it applies to all 
regions of the world, unlike the geographically limited regional treaties.40  Furthermore, it 
                                                          
37 Sambei, A, Civil Forfeiture (Confiscation in Rem): Explanatory and Impact Study (Council of Europe 2012), 5. 
38 Art 1.   
39  Supra n 23, art 6; supra n 28, art 5; supra n 19, art 44; and supra n 27, art 30.   
40 See for instance, Inter-American Convention on Extradition 1981, 20 ILM 723; European Convention on 
Extradition 1957, ETS. No. 24; and Economic Community of West African States Convention on Extradition 1994, 
A/P.1/8/94.    
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applies to almost all instances of organised crime, and therefore does not limit itself to particular 
crimes stipulated under the subject specific conventions.  At the time of ratification or accession, 
States can choose to use the UNTOC as a legal basis to facilitate extradition in the absence of the 
pre-existing treaties.  It is worth point out here that in 2008, 59 Member States stated that the 
UNTOC was to be taken as a legal basis for extradition.41  This does demonstrate that this 
instrument has been valued by a number of States.   
Several aspects of Article 16 should be expanded.  The principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare (extradite or prosecute) is explicitly recognised.  This principle becomes relevant 
particularly when States do not extradite their nationals, including Serbia.42  The facilitation of 
simplified procedure for extradition is also provided for.43  A good example of this is the system 
of European Arrest Warrant44 adopted by the European Union and its Member States, which has 
significantly shortened the amount of time it takes to surrender suspects or defendants.45  In 
addition, Article 16(14) provides that: 
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State 
Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or 
punishing a person on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political 
opinions or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any one of 
these reasons. 
 
This so-called ‘discrimination clause’ is crucial from a human rights perspective.  While the 
inclusion of the imposition of the death penalty and trial in absentia as additional grounds for 
refusal was debated during the drafting stage, it was later concluded that the sentence 
                                                          
41 Information Submitted by States in their Responses to the Checklist/Questionnaire on the Implementation of the 
United Convention against Transnational Organised Crime for the First Cycle, CTOC/COP/2008/CPR.7, 17-20.   
42 See below for more information.   
43 Art 16(8). 
44 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, [2002] OJ L 190/1.   
45 This regime will be relevant to Serbia when it becomes an EU Member State in the future.   
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‘extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by domestic law’ would be sufficient 
to cover other grounds.46 
Another important provision under the UNTOC relates to mutual legal assistance in 
criminal matters.  This is also facilitated bilaterally47 or multilaterally,48 the UNTOC being the 
latest instrument.  The most important provision is Article 18 which encourages State Parties to 
facilitate the following measures: 
(a) Taking of evidence or statements from other persons: 
(b) Effecting service of judicial documents; 
(c) Executing searches and seizures, and freezing; 
(d) Examining objects and sites; 
(e) Providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations; 
(f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including government, bank, 
financial, corporate or business records; 
(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary 
purposes; 
(h) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting State Party; and 
(i) Any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law of the requested State Party. 
The ambit of mutual legal assistance therefore is wide depending on the domestic law of each 
State Party.   
There are other important points to highlight in this provision.  Paragraph 8 provides that 
States cannot refuse mutual legal assistance on the basis of bank secrecy.  This makes action 
                                                          
46 Travaux Préparatoires, supra n 7, 152 and 155.     
47 See, for instance, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Australia) Order 1999 (Hong Kong); and Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Malaysia) Regulations 2006 (Australia).    
48 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1959, ETS. No. 30; Inter-American Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1992, OASTS No. 75; ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters; and Southern African Development Community Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters 2002.   See McClean, M, International Cooperation in Civil and Criminal Matters (Oxford University Press 
2002), Chapter 6.   
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against money laundering much easier.   Another interesting part is paragraph 9 on double 
criminality.  The draft paragraph initially stated that States ‘may not decline’ mutual legal 
assistance on the absence of double criminality.  The actual wording of paragraph 9, however, 
has been changed to ‘may decline.’  Some delegations during the drafting stage emphasised the 
importance of double criminality in mutual assistance,49 and it is evident that their view 
prevailed.  However, as a compromise, the same paragraph leaves open a possibility of providing 
assistance on a discretionary basis even in the absence of double criminality.  In addition, 
although the draft Article stated that offences covered in the UNTOC were not to be regarded as 
political in nature,50 the final version does not contain this sentence.  Organised crime can 
therefore be designated as a political offence for the purpose of mutual legal assistance.  Indeed, 
the interpretative note stipulates the possibility of the political offence exception.51  This should 
also be contrasted with Article 16 on extradition where it clearly states that offences under the 
UNTOC should be deemed extraditable (hence the political offence exception does not apply).  
Finally, the international community missed an important opportunity to include a discrimination 
clause as an additional ground for refusal of mutual legal assistance, which was included in 
Article 16 on extradition.  Although the United States proposed this clause during the drafting 
stage,  some delegates took a view that refusal on the ground of ‘other essential interest’ would 
cover this,52 and the clause was eventually dropped.  Worryingly, these inconsistencies can send 
conflicting messages to State Parties.   
There are a few more provisions which are relevant to international cooperation.  The 
first is Article 19 on joint investigations.  It encourages States to establish joint investigatory 
                                                          
49 Travaux Préparatoires, supra n 7, 177.   
50 Ibid, 170.  
51 Ibid, 199.  
52 Ibid, 185.   
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bodies through agreement or on a case-by-case basis.  During the drafting stage, whether this 
regime should be included as part of general mutual legal assistance was considered, but it was 
decided that a separate provision should be created.53  Once again, this has become an important 
mechanism within the EU context54 at least.  The second is Article 13 on international 
cooperation in confiscation of criminal proceeds whereby States are to identify, trace and 
confiscate proceeds when requested by other States.  Finally, transfer of criminal proceedings 
(Article 21) and direct law enforcement cooperation (Article 27) are also encouraged.  The latter 
is important as it can reduce political interferences as well as time to execute cooperation. In 
looking at these provisions, it is evident that the UNTOC provides a broad framework to 
encourage international law enforcement cooperation against transnational organised crime.    
3. Implementation of International Standards in Serbia  
3.1 Prohibition of Substantive Offences 
Having identified the important international standards on the action against transnational 
organised crime, it is now useful to explore the extent to which these are implemented in Serbia.  
With respect to definition of organised crime in national legislation, three statutes are pertinent: 
the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC),55 the Act on Organisation and Jurisdiction of Government 
Authorities in the Suppression of Organised Crime, Corruption and Other Severe Criminal 
Offences, 56 and the Criminal Code (CC).57  Firstly, the CPC defines organised crime as the 
commission of criminal offences by an organised criminal group or its members.58  Under this 
Code, organised criminal group means:  
                                                          
53 Ibid, 202. 
54 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams, [2002] OJ L 162/1; and Convention on 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the EU Member States 2000, art 13, [2000] OJ C 197/1.  
55 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No 72/2011, as amended. 
56 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No 42/2002, as amended. 
57 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No 85/2005 as amended. 
58 Art 2(1)(34). 
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a group of three or more persons, which exists for a certain period of time and acts in collusion with the 
aim of committing one or more criminal offences punishable by a term of imprisonment of four years or a 
more severe punishment, for the purpose of direct or indirect acquisition of pecuniary or other gain59  
 
The Act on Organised Crime also contain a definition which are identical to the CPC.60   Here, it 
is clear that these definitions are in line with the UNTOC.  Interestingly, however, the CC 
provides an additional definition of ‘organised group.’  Article 112(22) defines it as a group 
comprising ‘minimum of three persons acting in conspiracy to commit criminal offences.’  The 
fact that a separate definition was adopted indicates that it applies to those other than organised 
criminal groups whose main aim is not necessarily obtaining pecuniary or other benefits.  So for 
instance, a group of youths causing criminal damage or assaulting innocent citizens would come 
under this definition.   
 It is worth expanding whether the above definition can be applied to criminal groups 
operating in Serbia.  As noted earlier, there are around 60 organised criminal groups operating in 
and out of Serbia.  These are groups are mainly structured in a horizontal manner, in that their 
structure is not really hierarchical like the Italian mafia.61  In this regard, only 8.6% of these 
groups are said to have a high level of organisation.62  This suggests that the network model of 
an organised criminal group seems to be dominant in this country.  Further, about 25% of 
members working for groups with high level of organisation are said to be foreign nationals.63   
This perhaps is inevitable given the geographical location of Serbia in the Balkan region which 
are used as transit for illegal goods and even people, thereby necessitating criminals in various 
neighbouring States to work together.  In contrast, criminal groups with a low level of 
                                                          
59 Art 2(1)(33). 
60 Art 3.   
61 Papandera, D, ‘Serbia’ in Forte, R (ed.) Organised Crime and Fight against Crime in West Balkans: A 
Comparison with the Italian Models and Practices (SAPUCCA 2013),  32 
62 Ministry of Interior, supra n 1, 123.  
63 Ibid.   
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organisation (the network type) are seem to be actively locally and not internationally with a 
lesser number of foreign criminals.64   An important point to stress, however, is that many of 
these groups are connected one way or another in carrying out a variety of criminal activities, 
thereby demonstrating the complex nature of their operations as well as working relationships.  
In any event, it seems reasonable to argue that the definitions of organised criminal groups in the 
CPC and the Act on Organised Crime are wide enough to prosecute punish these groups 
operating in Serbia.   
In relation to prohibition of organised crime offences, the CC does not explicitly provide 
for participation offences explored above.  However, certain aspects can be punished by the 
relevant provisions. For instance, Article 345 creates an offence of conspiracy to commit an 
offence carrying at least 5 years’ imprisonment.  Here, the threshold is higher than 4 years under 
the definition of ‘serious crime’ in the UNTOC, clearly demonstrating a different understanding 
of ‘seriousness’.  The punishment for conspiracy is a fine or imprisonment of up to 1 year.  
Given the amount of profits criminals can make, it is doubtful whether this level of punishment 
can serve as effective deterrence.  Another relevant offence is ‘criminal alliance.’65  Under this, 
organising a group whose aims is to commit criminal offences carrying imprisonment of 3 years 
or more, as well as becoming a member of such group are prohibited.  The ambit of these 
offences is wide as these are not restricted to ‘organised criminal group.’   Also, the lower 
threshold of 3 years is used for this offence, and this shows that there is no uniform 
understanding of ‘seriousness’ under Serbian criminal law.  Further, inconsistency is evident in 
relation to the levels of punishments (3 to 5 years), and this can have a negative impact on 
effective suppression of participation offences.  
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Aside from participation offences, Serbia criminalises various forms of organised crime.  
One example is drug trafficking.  This is a serious problem due to the fact that Serbia is a major 
transit route for illegal drugs (e.g. the Balkan Route).66  The group of criminal offences in this 
connection includes unlawful production and distribution (Article 246 CC), unlawful keeping 
(Article 246 (a) CC) and facilitating the consumption (Article 247 CC).  In relation to unlawful 
production, it is worth highlighting that the involvement of organised criminal groups is regarded 
as an aggravating factor, attracting a minimum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment.  The recent 
case of Darko Šarić is worth mentioning in this regard.  He was a member of an organised 
criminal group and was convicted of trafficking 5.7 tonnes of cocaine from Latin America to 
Western Europe and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment in 2015. There were also related 
proceedings against others, and 21 member of his organised criminal group were eventually 
convicted and imprisoned for a combined total of 256 years and 11 months.  Involvement of an 
organised crime as an aggravating factor can be seen in other offences proscribed by the CC, 
such as kidnapping,67extortion,68 and blackmailing.69  This is an example of good practice as the 
statute seems take the serious, dangerous and sophisticated nature of organised crime into 
consideration in relation to sentencing.   
In addition, human trafficking has been identified as a growing crime in Serbia.  In 
addition to drugs, people are also trafficked to Western Europe through the Balkan Route, the 
most prominent example being the ongoing refugee crisis originating in Syria.  This offence was 
                                                          
66 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2015, at 
<www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol1/239011.htm> (last accessed 10 May 2016).   
67 Art 134. 
68 Art 214. 
69 Art 215. 
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introduced originally in 2003,70  but was amended when the new CC came into force in 2006.  
Article 338 provides that: 
Whoever by force or threat, deception or maintaining deception, abuse of authority, trust, dependency 
relationship, difficult circumstances of another, retaining identity papers or by giving or accepting money 
or other benefit, recruits, transports, transfers, sells, buys, acts as intermediary in sale, hides or holds 
another person with intent to exploit such person’s labour, forced labour, commission of offences, 
prostitution, mendacity, pornography, removal of organs or body parts or service in armed conflicts, shall 
be punished by imprisonment of two to twelve years.  
 
It is worth comparing this with the international definition of human trafficking adopted by the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 200071 attached to the UNTOC: 
Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 72 
 
The main conduct or actus reus of trafficking under the Serbian legislation is broadly in line with 
this international definition.  The willingness of the Serbian government to abide by the 
international standards therefore can be recognised to some extent.  However, variations also 
exist between the two definitions, particularly in relation to the element of exploitation, and this 
shows that the principle of State sovereignty is dominant in action against transnational 
organised crime.   
Further, risk averting activities are also criminalised by the CC.  For instance, money 
laundering73 carries an imprisonment of between 6 months to 5 years.  Compared to other 
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom,74 the punishments seem somewhat weak.  However, 
aggravating factors are simultaneously recognised.  One would, for instance, face up to 10 years’ 
imprisonment when the amount of laundered money exceeds 1.5 million Serbian dinars 
                                                          
70 Art 111b. 
71 2237 UNTS 319. 
72 Art 3.   
73 Art 231.  
74 The offence is punishable by imprisonment of up to 14 years under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
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(approximately $14,000).  If the offence is committed by a ‘group,’ the punishments would range 
from 2 to 12 years’ imprisonment, although this is not limit to organised criminal groups.   In 
addition, soliciting and receiving bribes are also prohibited with the imprisonment of up to 12 
years, whereas offering them would attract up 5 years.75  Further, obstruction justice (bribing and 
using/threatening violence against witnesses) is proscribed.76   In summary, substantive criminal 
law in Serbia does cover a range of organised crime offences and related conducts.    
 
3.2 Law Enforcement  
In Serbia, the key law enforcement measures against transnational organised crime 
explored earlier are governed by national legislation.  For instance, special investigative 
techniques are stipulated in Chapter VII of the CPC (Articles 161-187).  It lists six measures: 
interception of communications, surveillance and recording, simulated activities, computer data 
search, controlled delivery and undercover investigation.77  These measures can only be used for 
crimes listed under Article 162 including various forms of organised crime, and this underscores 
their special status.  A few of these measures are worth expanding.  Interception of 
communications involves the interception and recording of communications conducted by 
telephone or other technical means (e.g. faxes, e-mails, and mobile phones), surveillance of 
electronic or other address of the suspect, as well as seizure of letters and other parcels.78  Covert 
surveillance and recording of suspects in turn can be used to detect contacts or communications 
of a suspect in public places and places where access is limited, or to determine the identity of a 
                                                          
75 Arts 367 and 368.   
76 Art 336, which provides for 5 years’ imprisonment.  
77 Bošković, A., Pavlović, Z, ‘Special Evidentiary Actions in the Function of Combating Organized Crime in Serbia’ 
(2015) Journal of Eastern-European Criminal Law 40, 43.   
78 Art 166.  
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person or locate persons or objects.79  The main difference between these two measures is that 
interception involves communications through technical means, while in surveillance and 
recording, the primary focus is placed upon visual observation and surveillance of the person, 
with the second component being the surveillance of communications conducted ‘live’.   By 
‘simulated activities,’ the CPC means simulate purchase, sale or rendering of business services 
and/or simulated offering/accepting of bribes.80  Finally, undercover investigators can be 
deployed only if evidence cannot be collected through other means, suggesting that this is a 
method of last resort.     
An important point to stress here is that judicial approval is required for most of these 
measures.81  Judges can also request recorded materials for examination.82  Given the intrusive 
nature of special investigative techniques, these safeguards are quite important as they can 
prevent potential abuse on the part of the law enforcement agencies and protect the human rights 
of those affected.83  The legislation in the United Kingdom84 does not currently provide for prior 
judicial authorisation for measures such as interception of communications, and therefore the 
Serbian legal framework is an example of good practice.  Having said this, the CPC does not 
require prior judicial authorisation for controlled delivery and it is given by a prosecutor instead.  
On the one hand, some European States such as Belgium, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic also 
entrust their prosecutors to give such an authorisation,85 and there is no problem with this 
arrangement in principle as it may not affect one’s right to privacy as much as other measures.  
                                                          
79 Art 171. 
80 Art 174.  
81 Arts 167, 172, 175, 179, and 184.     
82 Arts 168, 171, 176, 180 and 186.   
83 Ivanović, Z, and Banović, B, Analysis of Legal Regulation on Communication Surveillance and Jurisprudence of 
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84 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  
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On the other hands, judicial approval does enhance accountability and impartiality, and judges 
authorise controlled delivery in other States such as Italy and Lithuania.86  Therefore, there is 
scope for further consideration in Serbia.   
A few more issues should be mentioned in relation to special investigative techniques.  
While the CPC states that interception of communications should last no longer than three 
months, this period can be extended for further three months.87  Exceptionally, for criminal 
offences under the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime or the Prosecutor's 
Office for War Crimes, this period can be extended two more times.88  This in fact means the law 
enforcement authorities can use this measure for a full year, and this is problematic from a 
human rights perspective.   In addition, interception relates to communications through telephone 
and other means and does not apply to direct oral conversations, thereby leaving a law 
enforcement gap.  A question has been raised as to whether surveillance can fill this gap by 
covering sound recording. The CPC makes it clear that this is used for the purpose of detecting 
communications, and does not explicitly authorise recording of the suspect’s communications 
per se.   Because of this, some have argued that these should only apply to visual recording. 89  A 
degree of uncertainly therefore remains, potentially affecting the ability of law enforcement 
authorities to detect organised crime.   
In addition to special investigative techniques, confiscation of the proceeds of crime is 
provided for under two laws in Serbia.  The first is the CC.  Confiscation is governed by Articles 
91-93, and the first point to highlight is that it is not regarded as a criminal sanction, but as 
having a sui generis character.  The confiscation of material gains is based on the explicit 
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89 Škulić, M, and Ignjatović, Đ, Organised Criminality (Organizovani kriminalitet) (Belgrade University 2012), 
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principle enshrined Article 91 that no one is allowed to retain the proceeds obtained by criminal 
offence.  It then follows that confiscation of such proceeds is mandatory.90   Under relevant 
provisions of the CC, confiscation can be enforced only in the presence of evidence that the 
respective proceeds originate from a crime.  This means that prior criminal conviction of a 
suspect is necessary.  In this regard, similar to other civil law jurisdictions in the continental 
Europe, Serbia does not recognise non-conviction-based confiscation such as civil asset 
recovery.   
The second relevant statute is the Act on Seizure of the Proceeds from Crime.91  This law 
applies to a limited number of crimes as stipulated in Article 2, such as organised crime, child 
pornography and drug offences.  It complements the CC as it provides for ‘extended confiscation 
of property’ (i.e. confiscation of property for which the convicted person is unable to prove its 
lawful origin).92  In this case, the burden is placed upon the defendant to prove their lawful 
origin, rather than on public prosecutor.93  While this may have implications for the human rights 
of defendants, such as presumption of innocence, it has been held by the European Court of 
Human Rights in the past that the purpose of confiscation proceedings is to recover proceeds 
illegally obtained and not to determine one’s guilt. 94  However, it has been pointed out that this 
extended confiscation may not properly work when the owner claims that the property 
                                                          
90 Stojanović, Z, Commentary to the Criminal Code (Komentar Krivičnog zakonika) (OSCE Mission to Montenegro 
2010), 270-271. 
91 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No 32/2013. 
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designated in the motion is not in their possession, that the lawful income is higher than that 
stated by the prosecutor, or that the property was acquired as inheritance, gift, etc.95    
A few other provisions under this Act are worth expanding.  For instance, the Act 
provides for financial investigations.  They can be instituted when there are reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that the proceeds in question derived from criminal offences (Article 15), and are 
conducted alongside criminal investigations.96  The Act also allows temporary, as opposed to 
permanent, seizure of proceeds if there is a risk that subsequent seizure of the proceeds would be 
hindered.  The safeguards here are that this is determined by an investigative judge upon the 
motion put forward by a public prosecutor (Article 21), and that the defendant and his/her 
defence lawyer will have an opportunity to challenge (Art 24).   
Finally, in relation to international cooperation, the Act on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters97 is the main legislative framework.  To begin with, this Act provides for extradition.  
While the general procedure is the same with other States, a few points are worth highlighting.  
For instance, Serbia generally does not extradite its own nationals to other States as noted earlier, 
with an exception of a few, such as Croatia, Montenegro, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia with which Serbia has concluded bilateral agreements.98 This makes the principle of 
aut dedere aut judicare quite important in order to ensure that suspects do not evade justice, and 
Serbia has confirmed that it does exercise jurisdiction over its own nationals who commit 
organised crime abroad.99  In terms of procedural safeguards to protect the rights of suspects, the 
principles of double criminality, political offence exception, speciality, safeguards against trial in 
                                                          
95 Škulić and Ignjatović, supra  n 89, 392. 
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absentia and the death penalty, as well as some due process rights such as legal advice are 
recognised.100   However, the Act does not go far to include a discrimination clause reflected in 
Article 16 of the UNTOC.   Another important point is that the Act does not currently provide 
for an expedite extradition procedure.  The need for speedy extradition procedure for organised 
crime has been recognised by Serbia, and together with other States in South-East Europe, it has 
been considering the adoption of a Regional Convention on Arrest Warrants.101  Whether this 
will materialise in the future is open to question, but Serbia is an EU candidate country, and it is 
expected that it will implement the European Arrest Warrant when it joins in the future.  
In relation to other international cooperation measures, the aforementioned Act also 
includes: execution of procedural activities (service of summonses and writs, hearing of the 
accused, examination of witnesses and experts, crime scene investigation, search of premises and 
persons, temporary seizure of objects); covert interception of communications and surveillance, 
controlled delivery; exchange of information and data; formation of joint investigative teams, 
and temporary surrender of a person in custody for the purpose of examination by the competent 
authority of the requesting state.  It is therefore evident that Serbia recognises the importance of 
international criminal justice cooperation.  In summary, the legislative frameworks on the key 
measures against organised crime are broadly in line with the international standards as 
represented by the UNTOC, and some examples of good practice are recognised.    
 
3.3 Critical Appraisal 
While the legislative frameworks may meet the minimum international standards, an 
important question to be asked is whether they are contributing to more effective action against 
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25 
 
transnational organised crime.   One important indication is the rate of prosecution and/or 
punishment.  To begin with, it is important to recognise that Serbia has a dedicated Special 
Prosecutor on Organised Crime.102  The existence of such a specialised body is beneficial in 
order to deal with complex cases of organised crime and therefore is an example of good practice 
as many other States do not even have such dedicated bodies.  It also sends a strong message to 
the general public that the Serbian government takes organised crime seriously.  Nevertheless, 
there are a number of issues which are hampering effective law enforcement in reality.  For 
instance, an examination of available statistical information does not point to a firm conclusion 
that organised crime offences are properly prosecuted and punished.  In relation to human 
trafficking, there were 55 cases being investigated by the law enforcement authorities in 2014, 
compared to 33 in cases in the previous year.103  While this increase may be a positive outcome, 
the number of traffickers actually prosecuted and convicted has decreased between 2013 and 
2014 at the same time.104  In addition, of 133 people charged by the Special Prosecutor for 
Organised Crime, only 60 were actually convicted in 2014.105  This can be compared with 233 
conviction in 2013.106  These examples perhaps indicate that the Serbian authorities are not able 
to obtain high quality evidence, and the value of special investigative techniques can be called 
into question as a result.  It has been noted in this regard that the Serbian police depends upon the 
security and intelligence agencies to carry out certain special investigative measures,107 
suggesting that they may not have the capacity to employ them.     
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There are other reasons why these laws are not enforced as well as expected.  For 
instance, corruption among the law enforcement agencies is regarded as problematic.108  The 
Serbia was said to have made some progress to tackle corruption, the most recent example being 
the adoption of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2013-2018.   Nevertheless, corruption is 
an ongoing problem.  One reason for this is that the police, prosecutors and judges do not have 
sufficient means to fight corruption.109  Other problems such as non-transparent employment 
procedure, poorly regulated career development, and a lack of awareness of ethical norms within 
the police organisation have been regarded as factors increasing the risk of corruption.110  It is 
important to highlight in this regard that the close to 75% of the Serbian population regard the 
police to be a corrupt organisation.111  In order to enhance the legitimacy of action against 
transnational organised crime and public confidence in law enforcement, therefore, Serbia has to 
do more to tackle corruption.   
Another issue is obstruction of justice through witness intimidation during criminal 
proceedings.  Their cooperation is essential in securing successful prosecution and punishment, 
but it has been pointed out that intimidation of witnesses, many of whom are also victims, 
continues, and that Serbia has not taken steps to address this.112  A lack of human, financial and 
other resources113 has once again been listed as one of the reasons for this.  Consequently, the 
Law on Protection Programme for Participants in Criminal Proceedings114 is not regarded as 
entirely effective, and Articles 23 (obstruction of justice) and 24 (protection of witnesses) of the 
UNTOC are not fully implemented.   Further, there is scope to consider amending Article 366 of 
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the CC which criminalises obstruction of justice.  The current punishment ranges from 6 months 
to 5 years’ imprisonment, but a question may be asked whether these serve as effective 
deterrence for criminals.  As a way of comparison, the same offence attracts a maximum of 15 
years’ imprisonment in Ireland.115   Although the deterrence effect of such an increase must be 
carefully assessed, this can at least send a stronger message to criminals that they will face 
severe consequences for evading justice.   
A number of issues have been identified in relation to confiscation of criminal proceeds 
as well.  For example, it has been reported that freezing of assets at an early stage of criminal 
investigations rarely happens in practice, with the result that these assets disappear before the 
authorities are able to confiscate them.116   One reason seems to be that prosecutors often see 
financial investigation as part of confiscation (i.e. after one is convicted), the despite the fact that 
the Act allows parallel investigations alongside criminal investigations.117   The need for proper 
training has been recognised by the Ministry of Interior, the sentiment also felt by the European 
Commission and the Council of Europe.118  Such training, however, should be extended to 
financial and related institutions which are in a position to detect and reports suspicious 
activities.   In this regard, a low level of reporting by these corporations has been raised as a 
concern.119   Another drawback is that application of the Act on Confiscation is limited in 
relation to money laundering, in a sense that the law enforcement authorities cannot take action 
unless the amount of laundered proceeds reaches at least 1.5 million Serbian dinars 
(approximately €12,200) in accordance with Article 231(2) of the CC.   
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Further, in relation to international law enforcement cooperation against organised crime, 
it is important to acknowledge from the outset that Serbia has become more proactive.  In 2014, 
the Special Prosecutor for Organised Crime received 91 requests seeking legal assistance from 
States including Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Montenegro, and 
Slovenia.120  These requests range from delivery of writs and objects related to criminal 
proceedings, documents, and other evidentiary materials, to cross-border surveillance and 
interception of communications.121  During the same period, the Special Prosecutor submitted 42 
requests for legal assistance in a variety of ways, mostly to its neighbours such as Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.122  Aside from these examples of judicial cooperation, 
Serbia has been intensifying direct police-cooperation.  It has, for instance, concluded a number 
of regional and bilateral agreements on police cooperation with a number of States,123 as well as 
the European agencies such as Europol.124   
While these suggest that the Ministry of Interior (Central Authority for mutual legal 
assistance) and the courts (execution of various orders) are active in facilitating international 
cooperation, it has been reported that the administrative capacity of those involved needs to be 
strengthened,125 and there is an ongoing need for more effective training for judges.126 In relation 
to police cooperation, it has been reported that Serbia should make further use of mechanisms 
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such as joint investigation teams,127 which are measures commonly utilised by the EU Member 
States as noted above.  Further, there have been some tensions between Kosovo and Serbia in 
facilitating criminal justice and police cooperation.  While Kosovo has concluded agreements 
with neighbouring States such as Albania and Montenegro, it is yet to do so with Serbia.128   This 
is making them and the Balkan region vulnerable to organised criminal activities as proper 
border control and management have yet to be implemented.129  Having said this, the problem 
here seems to be more political as the police forces in both Kosovo and Serbia work together 
directly or indirectly (through the United Nations Interim Authority in Kosovo and the EU Rule 
of Law Mission in Kosovo).130   In conclusion, while the legislative frameworks on organised 
crime, including procedural powers, exist and they more or less reflect the relevant international 
standards as represented by the UNTOC, their enforcement has not been as effective. 
4. Conclusion 
This article examined the implementation of international standards on action against 
transnational organised crime in Serbia.  It is evident that Serbia is making progress steadily.  
The legislative frameworks on substantive offences substantive offences seem to be in line with 
the UNTOC.  The existence of dedicated Special Prosecutor for Organised Crime is also an 
example of good practice.  However, it was also shown that certain procedural aspects such as 
special investigative techniques raise human rights and other concerns.  A lack of capacity and 
resources, which led to other serious issues such as corruption and obstruction of justice, is also 
an ongoing problem affecting the ability of the law enforcement authorities in tackling organised 
crime.  A wider issue is the management of the Balkan route.  The use of this route by organised 
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criminal groups has been known for a very long time, but the fact that drugs, arms and people 
continue to be trafficked through this route131 regularly clearly demonstrates that States in this 
region, including Serbia, have not been able to deal with the problem sufficiently.  This casts 
further doubt on the ability and willingness of these States to promote more effective cross-
border cooperation against transnational crime in the region and underscores the need for 
stronger external supports, particularly from European nations and institutions.  Serbia’s 
membership to the European Union is conditional upon the successful reform of criminal law 
and justice system, including its capacity to tackle transnational organised crime, and a strong 
pressure continues to be placed upon all of those concerned to take further action.   
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